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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 07-3954

CHESTER A. KING; ELIZABETH M. DARDEN, individually and in
their capacities as Co-Administrators and Administrators
Prosequendum of the ESTATE OF BERNARD A. KING, Deceased,
Appellants
v.
COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER; GLOUCESTER COUNTY JAIL;
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
MONROE TOWNSHIP; EDWIN BERWICK, MONROE TOWNSHIP POLICE
CHIEF; CHRISTOPHER HARRIS; MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN; ROBERT
DEMARZIO; RICHARD ANDRESS; WILLIAM GLAZE; DOMINIC CAPANNA;
JOHN VARALLI; GERALD SHANNON; DEREK BRITT; JAMES SHARP; ANDY
MCCLAVE; JUSTIN HATTON; STEVEN NEWSOME; BRIAN ZANE; TIMOTHY
KRULIKOWSKI; ROBERT BRUNO; RONNIE SANDY; BARRY FELLS; CRAIG
MONAHAN; JOHN RUMPF; HOWARD WIEMER

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D. N.J. No.: 03-cv-05863)
District Judge: The Honorable Renee M. Bumb

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 20, 2008

Before: BARRY, CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,* Judge

*

Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade,
sitting by designation.

(Opinion Filed: December 10, 2008)

OPINION

BARRY, Circuit Judge
Appellants, the parents of decedent Bernard King (“Bernard”),1 appeal from the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of John Rumpf, Craig Monahan, and
Howard Wiemer (the “individual defendants”), and in favor of Monroe Township and
Police Chief Edwin Berwick (“Township” or “municipal defendants”).
This lawsuit arises from Bernard’s tragic jailhouse death. On April 8, 2003,
Bernard was arrested by the Monroe Township Police Department for violating a
temporary restraining order that had been taken out against him by his step-mother,
Claudette King (“Claudette”), one week earlier. After processing, he was transferred to
the custody of the Gloucester County Sheriff’s Department. He was to be held overnight
at the Gloucester County jail, but upon arrival, Bernard began exhibiting bizarre behavior.
According to the complaint – which is unchallenged by defendants – three corrections
officers reacted to Bernard’s behavior by dragging him into an elevator, stopping it
between floors, and severely beating him. The corrections officers then dragged him into

1

Chester King (“Chester”) and Elizabeth Darden are Bernard’s biological parents, and
were the named plaintiffs, suing in their individual capacities and as co-administrators of
Bernard’s estate.
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a holding cell, where they left him face down and shackled to a bed post. Bernard died of
positional asphyxia before dawn.
Appellants originally filed suit against the County of Gloucester, the Gloucester
County Jail, the New Jersey Department of Corrections, and numerous corrections
officers, but have since voluntarily dismissed their claims against those parties pursuant to
settlement agreements. Their remaining claims were bottomed on the fact that the
Township Police Department sent Bernard to prison rather than to the hospital. Those
claims, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged that the individual defendants were
deliberately indifferent to Bernard’s medical needs, in violation of his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights; that the municipal defendants failed to adequately train
their officers, and developed customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of arrested citizens; and that these collective actions and omissions
were the proximate cause of Bernard’s death. Appellants also brought several claims
under New Jersey law, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and wrongful death.
The District Court granted summary judgment, concluding as a matter of law that
the individual defendants were not deliberately indifferent and, in any event, were entitled
to qualified immunity; that the municipal defendants neither failed to train their officers
nor created a culture of indifference to the medical needs of detainees; and that the state
law claims should be dismissed without prejudice. For the following reasons, we will
affirm.
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I.
Bernard had numerous encounters with the Township Police Department prior to
his arrest on April 8, 2003, at least three of which occurred in the two preceding weeks.
During each encounter, the effects of his severe mental disorder – schizoaffective
disorder, biopolar type – were apparent. One such encounter occurred on March 26,
2003, when officers responded to a complaint by Chester that Bernard had ransacked his
home and destroyed much of the furniture therein. Bernard was restrained and taken to
Underwood Memorial Hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. He remained at Underwood
until April 1, 2003, and hospital records reflect that he was suffering from
“schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type,” and that he was “currently manic.” Following
the furniture-destruction episode, Bernard’s step-mother, Claudette, sought and received a
temporary restraining order against him.
Late in the evening of April 8, 2003, Bernard went to Chester and Claudette’s
home and began ringing the door bell – thus initiating contact prohibited by the temporary
restraining order. Claudette, who was home alone, left the house through the back door,
and went to her son’s home next door. Her son called the police as Bernard drove away.
Sergeant Howard Wiemer (“Wiemer”) received a radio dispatch reporting that
Bernard had violated the restraining order, responded to the area of the violation, and saw
Bernard’s vehicle. He pulled Bernard over, identified him, and asked him to step out of
the vehicle. At that point, back-up officers Craig Monahan (“Monahan”) and John
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Rumpf (“Rumpf”) arrived. It is not disputed that Bernard was calm, polite, and compliant
at the time. He was placed under arrest, and transported to the Township police station by
Rumpf and Monahan. During the trip, Bernard was cooperative and aware of the
circumstances – he asked how long the process would take, and indicated that he needed
to be at work in the morning. Upon arrival at the station, he was handcuffed to a bench in
the holding area. He continued to be conversant and aware of his surroundings.
Rumpf took control of the processing and the investigation. In the process of
filling out the arrest report, he reviewed a copy of the temporary restraining order, which
indicated that Bernard was “bipolar/manic depressive” and “just released [from the
hospital].” Rumpf also spoke with Claudette, who arrived at the police station to file a
victim statement. Claudette described the events of that evening, and the furnituredestruction episode, in some detail. She indicated that Bernard was bipolar, and that he
should have been taking medication. She declined to post bail of $250 because she did
not want Bernard on the street before the hearing the following morning.
After Claudette informed Rumpf that Bernard should have been on medication,
Rumpf further investigated the matter. He first asked Bernard about his medication, and
Bernard responded that he was not supposed to be taking medication and had not done so.
Rumpf asked Monahan whether he located any medication in Bernard’s car, and
Monahan indicated that he had not. In his deposition, Rumpf stated that he paid
particular attention to Bernard’s demeanor – evaluating him for “signs of mental distress,
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his mood, his perception, [whether] he was under duress, if he was disheveled in any way,
[whether] he look[ed] like he was in danger of [harming] himself or in danger of
inflicting harm to anybody else or property” – and that he showed no disturbing signs.
Rumpf, therefore, determined that a psychiatric screening was unnecessary and called for
a transfer to the Gloucester County prison.2 Bernard did not survive the night.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a
district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the underlying facts and
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion for summary judgment. Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir.
1995). Accordingly, a district court’s grant of summary judgment is proper only if “there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828,
832-33 (3d Cir. 2002).
III.
A. Individual Defendants. Appellants assert: (1) that there are outstanding issues

2

Sergeant Barry Fell of the Gloucester County Sheriff’s Department arrived at the
Township police station to transport Bernard, and found him handcuffed to the bench,
exhibiting a calm demeanor. Fell spoke briefly with several Township police officers,
and asked Bernard medical questions for the County’s intake form. Bernard did not
indicate that he was in need of medical attention, nor did his demeanor betray a need for
medication or hospitalization. The Gloucester County Prison records reflect that
Bernard’s mental and physical condition, upon intake, was “okay.”
6

of material fact regarding whether the individual defendants were deliberately indifferent
to Bernard’s medical needs; and (2) that the individual defendants were not entitled to
qualified immunity. We address these assertions in turn.
“To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs must demonstrate a
violation of a right protected by the Constitution or the laws of the United States
committed by a person acting under the color of state law.” Natale v. Camden County
Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 580-81 (3d Cir. 2003). Because it is undisputed that the
individual defendants were acting under color of state law, our focus is on whether they
violated Bernard’s constitutional rights.
The contours of the constitutional rights at issue are not clearly defined, as they
involve an intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. “The Eighth
Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishments is violated by ‘deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp.,
463 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1983) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Yet,
“the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not apply until
‘after sentence and conviction.’” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F. 3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005)
(Hubbard I) (quoting Graham v. Conor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 n. 6 (1989)). Because
Bernard was a pretrial detainee, the Eighth Amendment “has no [direct] application.”
City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 244. The applicable constitutional protection is the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which “does require the
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responsible...governmental agency to provide medical care” to pre-trial detainees, id.,
because the failure to do so amounts to punishment without an adjudication of guilt. See
Hubbard I, 399 F. 3d at 166.
In assessing the denial of medical care to a pretrial detainee, the inquiry is whether
the denial was “imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it [was] but an
incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
538 (1979). That inquiry involves an indirect application of the Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference standard: “the Supreme Court has concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment affords pretrial detainees protections ‘at least as great as the Eighth
Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner,’ without deciding whether the
Fourteenth Amendment provides greater protections.” Natale, 318 F.3d at 581 (quoting
City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 244); see also Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612
F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that “at a minimum the ‘deliberate indifference’
standard of Estelle v. Gamble, must be met”).
Appellants do not argue that the Fourteenth Amendment provides greater
protection than the Eighth Amendment in the context of pretrial detainees, and instead
contend that the individual defendants were deliberately indifferent to Bernard’s serious
medical needs. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Under similar circumstances in Natale, we
stated: “[a]s the issue was not raised before us, we do not decide whether the Due
Process Clause provides additional protections to pretrial detainees beyond those
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provided by the Eighth Amendment to convicted prisoners.” 318 F.3d at 581 n. 5.
“We therefore evaluate [plaintiffs’] Fourteenth Amendment claim for inadequate
medical care under the standard used to evaluate similar claims brought under the Eighth
Amendment, the same standard used by the District Court [below].” Id. at 582. “The
standard enunciated in Estelle is two-pronged: ‘[i]t requires deliberate indifference on the
part of prison officials and it requires the prisoner’s medical needs to be serious.’”
Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d
Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). The District Court found that an issue of fact existed as to
whether Bernard had a serious medical need, but also found that, as a matter of law, the
individual defendants did not act with deliberate indifference to that need. (Appendix,
“A.”, at 12). The parties have focused on the latter finding, as do we.
Deliberate indifference requires more than inadequate medical attention or
incomplete medical treatment. “[A]cting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding
that risk.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). Therefore, appellants were
required to show that the prison officials knew of a substantial risk of serious harm –
which may be inferred if the risk was obvious – and failed to act despite that knowledge.
Id. at 842. The District Court properly concluded that, even viewing the evidence in
appellants’ favor, the requisite showing had not been made.
Appellants’ central argument before us is that given Bernard’s extensive history
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with the Township Police Department, the individual defendants were aware of his severe
mental disorder, and that their awareness gave rise to an obligation to take him to the
hospital for psychiatric treatment. In support of that argument, they stress that at least
two of the individual defendants – Rumpf and Monahan – knew of Bernard’s mental
disorder. There is, indeed, sufficient evidence in the record to support that conclusion.
But to show deliberate indifference, appellants were also required to demonstrate that the
individual defendants were subjectively aware that the mental disorder, if not immediately
treated, would pose “a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id.; and see id. at 837 (“the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference”); see also
Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001) (“the official must actually be
aware of the existence of the excessive risk; it is not sufficient that the official should
have been aware”).3
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In vacating the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity in Rouse v. Plantier, we
stressed the importance of determining the immediacy of the risk. 182 F.3d 192, 198-99
(3d Cir. 1999). There, plaintiffs were a class of insulin-dependent diabetic prisoners who
alleged that New Jersey corrections officials were deliberately indifferent to their medical
needs. We noted that “not all insulin-dependent diabetics require the same level of
medical care.” Id. at 198. There are “unstable” diabetics “whose blood sugar levels
consistently fluctuate...[and who] require intensive medical treatment.” Id. There are
also “stable” diabetics, “whose blood sugar levels remain [relatively constant] over time.”
Id. “Consequently,” a level of care that “violates the Eighth Amendment rights of the
unstable plaintiffs may not violate the constitutional rights of the stable plaintiffs.” Id. at
199. Here, had Bernard been acting in an unstable manner, indicating that the need for
treatment was urgent, the officers may have been constitutionally required to take him to
the hospital. That was not the case.
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There is no evidence that Bernard required immediate treatment, or that the
officers drew that inference; indeed, there is substantial evidence to the contrary. Bernard
was calm, conversant, and aware of his surroundings. When asked by Rumpf if he was
on medication, or needed medication, Bernard answered in the negative. Although
Claudette warned Rumpf that Bernard “should be sent back” to the hospital, there was no
indication that a night in jail – with a hearing scheduled before a state judge early the
following morning – posed a substantial risk of serious harm. Without more, we cannot
conclude that there is a jury question regarding whether the individual defendants were
deliberately indifferent to Bernard’s medical needs.4
In any event, the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
“Under certain circumstances, government officials are protected from . . . § 1983 suits by
qualified immunity.” Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 492 (3d Cir. 2006). A qualified
immunity analysis includes two steps: first, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the
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Indeed, without more, the individual defendants could not have forced Bernard to
undergo unwanted medical treatment. Pretrial detainees have a qualified “right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment,” which controls unless the detainee has demonstrated that
he is dangerous to himself or others. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 112, 113 (3d Cir.
1990). Thus, unless Bernard’s behavior indicated that he was dangerous to himself or
others (and there is nothing in the record suggesting that was the case), he could not be
medicated without his consent.
As the District Court noted, plaintiffs were essentially asking it to impose a duty
on local police departments to involuntarily send all detainees with a known history of
mental illness to a mental health center for evaluation and treatment. (A. 13). That is not
what the law requires, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, or even allows, see White, 897 F.2d
at 112.
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party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutional right?”; and, second, “if a violation [can] be made out, the next . . . step is
to ask whether the right was clearly established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001). Even assuming plaintiffs could prevail at the first step, they could not at the
second. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly
established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable police officer that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. Thus, “[t]he qualified immunity
standard ‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Giles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 203
(3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)). Here, the individual
defendants found themselves between two competing obligations: the need to respect
Bernard’s constitutional right to decline medical treatment, see White, 897 F.2d at 112
and supra note 6, and the obligation to be responsive to his medical needs, see Natale,
318 F.3d at 582. See also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (holding that determination of
whether right is clearly established “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of
the case”). Their conduct cannot, therefore, be considered clearly unlawful.
B. Municipal Defendants. Appellants contend that Monroe Township and its
police chief, Edwin Berwick, are liable for failing to adequately train the Township’s
police officers, and for developing customs that exhibited deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of detainees. They assert that the District Court’s conclusion to the
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contrary was error. We disagree.
The burden on a plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability in a § 1983 claim
is quite high. As the Supreme Court stated in Board of County Commissioners of Bryan
County v. Brown:
[I]t is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly
attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that,
through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’
behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal
action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must
demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the
deprivation of federal rights.
520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (emphasis in original); see Monell v. New York City Dept. of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Because appellants did not establish a
constitutional violation, they likewise did not establish that the Township was the
“moving force” behind a constitutional violation. See Startzel v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d
183, 204 (3d Cir. 2008).
C. State Claims. Lastly, appellants contend that their state claims should be
reinstated. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district court has the discretion to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.” That discretion was not abused here. See Novak v. MetroHealth
Med. Ctr., 503 F.3d 572, 583 (6th Cir. 2007) (“When all federal claims are dismissed
before trial, the balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law
claims”) (citations omitted).
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IV.
We will affirm the District Court’s September 6, 2007 order granting summary
judgment in favor of the individual and municipal defendants, and dismissing the state
law claims without prejudice.
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